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This paper examines equilibrium properties of local jurisdictions implied by the Tiebout-
style model.  A set of equilibrium conditions are derived from a general equilibrium 
model of local jurisdictions.  The conditions are parameterized and empirically estimated 
in a two-stage procedure.  The method is applied to communities in a Portland 
metropolitan area with an extension of public-good provision to include environmental 
amenities.  The results suggest that the model can replicate many of the empirical 
regularities observed in the data.  For example, the predicted income distributions across 
communities closely matched the observed distribution.  The estimated income elasticity 
of housing demand is consistent with previous findings.  One important finding of this 
paper is that the parameter estimates would be biased if environmental amenities are not 
considered.   
  
 Environmental Amenities and Community Characteristics: An Empirical Study of 
Portland, Oregon  
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Nearly four of five Americans live within 273 metropolitan regions.  These regions 
include a central city of at least fifty thousand people, suburbs around the central city, 
suburbs that have grown into “edge cities,” and a fringe of countryside (Daniels 1999).  
In 1993, the United States Office of Budget and Management classified more than one-
quarter of the nation’s 3,041 counties as belonging to metropolitan area (Daniels, 1999).  
The Census Bureau estimates that America will add 34 million people between 1996 and 
the year 2010.  Most of this growth will occur in metropolitan areas.  As population and 
economic growth pressure push outward from the suburbs, the challenge of managing 
land use in the metropolitan area becomes more important and complex.  Management of 
land use means striking a balance between economy and population needs on one hand 
and land development and environmental quality on the other.  Understanding 
households’ residential choices in a system of local jurisdictions is necessary for 
designing efficient growth management strategies for metropolitan area.   
This paper examines households’ residential choices and the resulting 
characteristics of communities using the framework developed by Epple and Sieg (1999).  
Specifically, the objectives of this paper are two fold.  First, robustness of the relatively 
new method for estimating spatial equilibrium model developed by Epple and Sieg 
(1999) is tested using data from the Portland Oregon metropolitan area.  Second, the 
framework of spatial equilibrium model is extended by including environmental 
amenities for the interests from a policy perspective.  The robustness of the spatial equilibrium model is tested by comparing the predicted distribution of household by 
income across communities.  The consequence of disregarding environmental amenities 
in the estimation of equilibrium models of local jurisdictions, as did in Epple and Sieg 
(1999), is investigated.  Properties of the spatial equilibrium implied by the model are 
examined.  These properties entail strong predictions about the distribution of household 
by income across communities.    
A proper empirical analysis of public-good provision in spatial equilibrium 
requires a complete specification of community choice (Rubinfeld, Shapiro, and Roberts, 
1987).  This paper provides an integrated approach by drawing inferences from a 
structural general equilibrium model.  The incorporation of environmental amenities in 
the spatial equilibrium model captures and isolates households’ preferences for 
environmental amenities from public-good provision.  Although much research has 
focused on valuing environmental amenities indirectly from property values (e.g., 
hedonic property price model), few studies have measured the households’ preferences 
for environmental amenities directly from index of structure parameters.    
In the next section, a brief review of relevant literature is provided.  Equilibrium 
conditions of distribution of household by income across local jurisdictions are derived in 
section 4.3.  The equilibrium conditions are parameterized and empirically estimated in 
two stages in section 4.4.  The first stage estimates the parameters that determine the 
income distribution across local jurisdictions.  The second stage estimates parameters 
characterizing households’ preferences for public goods and environmental amenities.  
The estimated parameters with and without the inclusion of environmental amenities are 
compared and discussed.  Households' preferences for environmental amenities and public goods are measured.  The environmental amenity measures include distance to a 
major river, proportion of open space and parks, proportion of wetland, proportion of 
rural land, and elevation.  Data used in the empirical estimations is discussed in section 
4.5.  The empirical results are reported and discussed in section 4.6.  Conclusions are 
drawn in section 4.7.     
 
 
II.  Literature Review 
 
 
Since the publication of the theoretical model of local finance by Tiebout (1956), Tiebout 
has served as the point of departure for a now lengthy series of theoretical and empirical 
investigations into local fiscal behavior, particularly in metropolitan areas.  The central 
idea of Tiebout hypothesis implies decentralized provision of public services for 
economic efficiency.   
The Tiebout mechanism is used to investigate institutional governing boundary.  
Epple and Romer (1989) argued that even in a system with many jurisdictions, flexibility 
of boundaries is a key factor determining how land rents get allocated within and across 
communities.  Wheaton (1993) examined land capitalization, Tiebout mobility, and the 
role of zoning regulations.  Pogodzinski and Sass (1994) investigated how jurisdictions 
compete through their choice of tax-expenditure packages and zoning regulations via the 
Tiebout mechanism.   
The Tiebout hypothesis is also used to analyze whether property taxes and public 
spending affect property values.  Oates (1969) estimated the effects of property taxes and 
local public spending on housing prices.  Fisch (1977) used a spatial equilibrium model 
with local public goods to analyze urban rent, optimal city size, and the Tiebout hypothesis.  Gyourko and Tracy (1986) examined the political economy of capitalization 
in a Tiebout model when there is a rent-seeking public bureaucracy.  Mieszkowski and 
Zodrow (1989) examined the differential effects of head taxes, taxes on land rents, and 
property taxes on land prices and housing prices or rents in a Tiebout model. 
A number of studies have investigated the existence and properties of equilibrium 
in a system of local jurisdictions (e.g., Ellickson 1971; Westhoff 1977; Epple, Filimon, 
and Romer 1984, 1993).  Other related research focuses on the estimation of demand 
functions for local public goods.  Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) developed a method 
for estimating demand functions for municipal public services.  This included both 
traditional price and income variables and demographic characters in the demand 
functions.  However, they ignored the effects of migrations, which are subject to a self-
selection bias or Tiebout bias.  Rubinfeld, Shapiro, and Roberts (1987) controlled the 
Tiebout bias by adding a selection function.  However, their empirical analysis was done 
without theoretical specifications.   
 
 
III.  A Review of the Framework of Local Jurisdictions 
  
 
This section describes the general framework of local jurisdictions developed in several 
previous studies including Epple, Fillimon and Romer (1984), Epple and Romer (1991) 
and Wu (2001).  Suppose there are J communities with fixed boundaries and 
homogenous land in a metropolitan area.  Each community offers a public good, g , 
which may be thought of as a composite function of locally provided public goods and 
environmental amenities.  Each household maximizes a utility function subject to its 
budget constraint:  
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 s.t.  x y ph − =  
  
 where  α = taste parameter 
   h= housing good 
  x= composite private good 
  y = household income. 
 
The optimization of equation (1) can be solved to derive an indirect utility function, 
assuming there are no regulatory constraints on housing choices.  The indirect utility 
function of a household is 
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The tradeoff between the housing price, p and the public good, g for the household is 
decided by applying the implicit function theorem to equation (2): 
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A key assumption that affects the equation of local jurisdiction concerns how the tradeoff 
changes as income changes.  Epple and Sieg (1999) assume that the tradeoff is 
monotonically increasing inα and y everywhere.  This assumption implies three 
necessary conditions for intercommunity equilibrium (Epple and Sieg 1999):  (1) 
Boundary indifference: Households are indifferent on the boundary between two 
neighboring communities.  This condition is expressed as  
  . J ,..., j )}, y , p , g , ( V ) y , p , g , ( V ) y , ( { I j j j j j 1 1 1 1 − = = = + + α α α  (4) 
(2) Stratification: For eachα , the households of community j  with income y  is given by 
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−1 . (5) (3) Increasing bundles: For two communities i and  j  with 
j i p p > , then 
j i g g >  if and 
only if  ) ( y ) ( y
j i α α > .  Note that the utility function is separable in the public and 
private goods.  This assumption can be relaxed by substituting structural parameter 
B with a function of  g .  The assumption is maintained since the relaxation of the 
assumption would complicate the second stage estimation. 
 
IV.  Estimation of the Equilibrium Model 
The framework is parameterized for empirical estimation.  Following Epple and Sieg 
(1999), the indirect utility function is assumed to take the form:  
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  The boundary indifference condition for community j  and  1 + j  can be written as 
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The distribution of households across communities are illustrated in figure 4.1.  The 
populations in community j can be obtained by integrating between the lines that go 
through  1 − j K  and  j K :   
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y d d y f C P , (9) where )) ln( ), (ln( y f α  is the joint distribution form of  ) ln(α and  ) ln(y and it is assumed to 
be bivariate normally distributed.  The equation above is solved recursively to obtain the 
community-specific intercepts as a function of  ) , , , , , , ( ν ρ σ σ λ µ µ α α y y  and community 
sizes.  Theqth quantile of the income distribution in community j ,  ) (q j ζ , is implicitly 
defined by   
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ν α α . (10) 
The parameters are estimated in a two-stage procedure.  The first stage estimation 
is to match observed income distributions in communities with those predicted by the 
framework.  This step determines parameters of income distribution, ) ln(y µ  and  ) ln(y σ ; the 
correlation between income and tastes,λ ; the ratio of ) ln( / α σ ρ ; and the income elasticity 
of housing,ν .  It also verifies the reliability of the framework.  The second stage 
estimates structural parameters, ρ  and η; parameters of taste distribution, ) ln(α µ  
and ) ln(α σ ; a parameter that characterizes households' preference for different public 
goods and environmental attributes.  The vectors of observed characteristics of 
community,γ , include parameters of public attributes (education expenditure, 1 γ  and 
crime rate, 2 γ ) and parameters of environmental amenities (distance to a major river,  3 γ , 
proportion of open space and parks,  4 γ , proportion of wetland,  5 γ , proportion of rural 





 The First-Stage Estimation 
 
 
  The parameters of the model characterize the distribution of households across 
communities and the income distribution within each community.  It is known that  
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The equation can be rewritten as  
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= .  To solve equation (12), a Monte Carlo integration technique is used because integration 
of the inner integral of equation (12) is not feasible.  The Monte Carlo integration is done 
in the following procedure. 
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To normalize the weighting function, we assume that 
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is a known constant.  Then  G y g y h / )) (ln( )) (ln( =  is a probability density function in the 
range of  )] ( ln[ , [ p j ζ −∞  because it satisfies the axiom of probability.  Let  
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The equation (16) can be rewritten as  
  ) ( ))] (ln( [ )) (ln( j y h C pP y f GE =  (20) 
where  ))] (ln( [ )) (ln( y f E y h  denotes the expected value of the function, )) (ln(y f when 
) ln(y is drawn from the population with probability density function  )) (ln(y h .  A subset 
of the parameters of the equation (20) can then be estimated using a Minimum Distance 
Estimator.  The optimization procedure to evaluate the model relies on a numerical 
simulation technique.  An advantage of this estimator is that data on housing price and public good provision is not needed and only an income distribution function is necessary 




The Second Stage Estimation 
 
 
  The remaining structural parameters are estimated using data on locally provided 
public goods and environmental amenities.  Following the empirical literature on 
differentiated products in industrial organizations and Epple and Sieg (1999), we assume 
the level of public good supply can be expressed as an index that consists of locally 
provided public goods (e.g., school quality and crime rates) and environmental amenities 
(e.g., elevation, proportion of land in open space): 
  j j j x g ε γ + =
' . (21) 
 where  j x  = observed characteristics of community j  
  γ = parameter vectors to be estimated 
  j ε = error terms 
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where  j Q is a monotonic function of  j p  and  j K  can be estimated as shown in the 
previous section.  The equation can be rewritten as 
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If we substitute (23) into equation (21)  
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Using equation (15), the following equation is derived. 
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If we substitute equation (25) into (24), we can derive the following nonlinear regression 
model. 
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Using the data of price,  j p  and characteristics, j x  in addition to the parameters estimated 
in the first stage  ) , , , ( ) ln( ) ln( λ ν σ µ y y and the reduced-form parameter, j Ω , the parameters 
) , , , , , ( 2 1 β β γ η ρ B are identified in the above nonlinear regression equation (26).  The 
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 V.  Data 
 
 
The empirical study focuses on the metropolitan area of Portland, Oregon. The Portland 
metropolitan area includes three counties, 44 cities, and 48 townships
1 within Tri-Met 
(Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon)’s political boundaries.  The 
92 communities (44 cities and 48 townships) differ in terms of size and socioeconomic 
characteristics.  The city of Portland is the largest community with 218,700 households 
and the smallest community is a township with 39 households.  The poorest community 
is a township with a median household income of $18,730 and the richest community is 
the city of Durham with a median household income of $58,152.  Household income and 
education expenditure per household are taken from the 1997 U.S. Census.  A GIS 
database from Metro Data Resource Center in Portland, Oregon is used to calculate the 
average housing price in each community.  The database is also used to estimate 
measures of environmental amenities in each community, including distance to a major 
river, proportion of open space and parks, proportion of wetlands, proportion of rural 
lands, and elevation.  All distances are measured from the center of communities using 
the Geographical Information System (GIS), Arc View.  The center of communities is 
defined as where the city hall is located.  The average elevation of each community is 
calculated as the average of elevations at each residential site in the community.  Data on 
crime rates is obtained from CAP index Inc., one of the crime risk assessment data.  A 
risk is rated by Crime Against Persons and Property (CAP) index, with 1 being the least 
risk of violent crime and 10 being the most risk of violent crime of each community.   
                                                 
1 There are no official townships in Oregon.  The townships are defined by the public land survey.   Figure 4.2 shows the housing price of each community.  The housing price and 
median household income is strongly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.89.  In 
fact, local public-good provision is multidimensional (school quality, crime, parks, 
pollution, etc), crime rate and education expenditure per household are to express level of 
the public good provision because lack of better data.  The education expenditure per 
household does not wholly represent the quality of education.  A more objective school 
quality index would include average test scores and other relevant factors.  But the data is 
not available for the Portland metropolitan area at this point.  However, a previous study 
of Boston metropolitan area showed that education expenditure is a fairly good 
approximate measure of education quality (Epple and Sieg, 1999).  Figure 4.3 reports the 
education expenditures by community (arranged by ascending order of the median 
household income).  There is a strong correlation between median household income and 
education expenditures (0.80).   
Figure 4.4 shows the crime rate by community (arranged by ascending order of 
the median household income).  The correlation between median household income and 
crime rate is –0.62, which is expected because communities with higher income tend to 
have lower crime rates. 
The following variables are used for measuring environmental amenities: the 
distance between the community center and a major river, proportion of open space and 
parks, proportion of wetlands, proportion of rural lands, and elevation.  The distance from 
a major river is used to represent possible recreational accessibilities or visual amenities 
associated with rivers.  Figure 4.5 reports the distance from a major river by each 
community.  The correlation between median household income and distance to a major river is –0.38.  This reflects the fact that richer households tend to locate closer to a major 
river.   
Figure 4.6 reports the proportion of land that is on open space and parks in each 
community.  The correlation between median household income and the proportion of 
open space and parks is 0.37, implying that high-income households tend to locate in 
communities with more open space and park area.   
Figure 4.7 reports the proportion of wetlands in each community.  The correlation 
between the proportion of wetland and median household income is 0.13.  The 
correlation shows that high-income households have a positive preference for wetland 
areas, but the preference is not as strong as the preference for open space and parks.   
Figure 4.8 reports the proportion of rural land in each community.  There is a 
negative correlation, -0.10, between income and proportion of a community, implying 
high-income households are more likely to be located in community with less rural land.  
Figure 4.9 reports the elevation of each community.  There is a positive correlation, 0.30, 
between income and elevation, implying that high-income households are more likely to 
be located in the hills surrounding Portland.  Households prefer housing with good views, 
and elevation is critical to generate good views in most places.  The summary of variables 
is shown in table 4.1. 
 
 
VI.  Empirical Results 
 
First Stage Estimates 
The structural parameters of the spatial equilibrium model of local jurisdictions are 
estimated using a two-stage procedure.  The first stage estimates the parameters of the income distribution ( ) ln(y µ and  ) ln(y σ ), the correlation between income and tastes,λ , the 
ratio of ) ln( / α σ ρ , and the income elasticity of housing,ν  (see table 4.2). 
Over all, the five parameters estimated in the first stage have reasonable 
magnitudes with small standard errors.  The reported standard errors include numerical 
errors caused by Monte Carlo integration and inversion of the function.  Specifically, the 
point estimators of  ) ln(y µ and  ) ln(y σ  are highly significant.  The figure 4.10 shows the 
predicted and observed median income for each community in the Portland metropolitan 
area.   
The communities are arrayed by ascending order of the median household income.  
Community 92 has the highest median income and community 1 has the lowest median 
income.  The difference between observed and predicted median income is less than 5 % 
in average, which shows the model fits the data well.  This verifies that the framework 
used in this study is reasonably reliable.  The correlation between income and taste for 
public goods,λ , is –0.0135 and highly significant.  The income elasticity of housing,ν , 
is 0.925 which indicates income elasticity of housing in Portland metropolitan area is 
relatively high.  The magnitude of the elasticity is consistent with previous findings.  For 
example, Polinsky and Ellwood (1979) estimate that the income elasticity of housing 
demand is over 0.8.  Harman (1988) estimates it as 1, and Haurin and Lee (1989) 
estimate it as 1.1.  Epple and Sieg (1999) estimate it as 0.938.  This consistency of the 
result of income elasticity of housing demand is additional support for the reliability of 
the framework, especially since there were no constraints of value of the income 
elasticity in this framework.      
 The Second Stage Estimates   
 
The second stage estimates structural parameters,  ρ  and η; parameters of taste 
distribution, ) ln(α µ  and ) ln(α σ ; and parameters that characterizes households' preference for 
different public goods and environmental attributes.  In this set of specifications, the 
assessed vale of structure is included as an explanatory variable in linear, log linear, and 
quadratic specifications.  The results are reported in table 4.3.              
The estimated coefficients on the environmental amenity variables indicate that 
distance to major rivers, proportion of open space and park, proportion of wetland, and 
elevation affect the overall level of environmental amenities.  The coefficients of all the 
three specifications show that households prefer communities with higher education 
expenditure, lower crime rate, closer to major rivers, higher proportion of open space and 
parks, higher proportion of wetland, and higher elevation.  The significant coefficients of 
the quadratic specification indicate: 1) the effect of education expenditure on public-good 
provision decreases as the expenditure increases, 2) the effect of crime rate on public-
good provision increases as the CAP index increases, 3) the effect of distance to a major 
river decreases as the distance increases, 4) the effect of proportion of wetland increases 
as the proportion increases, and 5) the effect of elevation decreases as the elevation 
increases.    
Epple and Sieg (1999) estimated a spatial equilibrium model of local jurisdiction 
using data from Boston metropolitan area, but they excluded environmental amenities.  In 
order to demonstrate the importance of environmental amenities in household's local 
decisions, we also estimate the model by excluding the environmental variables.  The 
results are reported in table 4.4.   The point estimates of ) ln(α µ  and ) ln(α σ  are significant.  However, the absolute 
values of estimates of ) ln(α µ  and ) ln(α σ  are greater in the estimates without environmental 
variables than in the estimates with environmental variables.  This indicates that 
parameter estimates not including environmental amenities over estimate both the 
magnitude and heterogeneity of tastes among households.    
The positive and highly significant coefficients on education expenditure in both 
estimates show that households value quality education associated with high education 
expenditures and would be willing to pay for it.  The negative coefficients on crime rate 
show that higher crime rates have a negative effect on public-good provision.  Both the 
effects of education expenditures and the crime rate are greater in the estimates without 
environmental variables than in the estimates with environmental variables.  This 
indicates that households’ willingness to pay for quality of education and safety would be 
over estimated if spatial heterogeneity of environmental amenities is ignored.   
 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
 
In a recent paper, Epple and Sieg (1999) developed a new method for estimating spatial 
equilibrium models of local jurisdictions.  The method estimates the structural parameters 
by matching quantiles of household's income distributions and by exploring boundary 
indifference conditions implied by rational residential choices of households.  They 
applied the method to communities in Boston with two local public goods (school quality 
and crime rate) but ignored environmental amenities.  They point out that further research 
is needed to address the question how robust the method is to different data sets from 
different metropolitan areas.  They also suggest that extending vectors of public-good provision to include environmental amenities is interesting from a policy perspective.  
This paper extends Epple and Sieg (1999) in both aspects.   
We applied the method to communities in the Portland metropolitan area with an 
extension of public-good provision to include environmental amenities.  The results 
suggest that the model can replicate many of the empirical regularities observed in the 
data.  For example, the predicted income distributions across communities closely 
matched the observed distribution.  The estimated income elasticity of housing demand is 
consistent with previous findings.   
One important finding of this paper is that the parameter estimates are biased if 
environmental amenities are not considered.  This result is not surprising given that 
relative importance of alternative environmental amenities and public goods to 
households.  These results can increase the understanding of households’ residential 
choices and contribution to the design of efficient growth management strategies in 
metropolitan areas.   References 
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Figure 4.10  Median Income by Communities  







Median household income ($)  35,358 
(8634) 
Housing price ($)  118,820 
(33,284) 




Crime rate  3.38 
(1.64) 
Distance to major river or lake (mile)  1.24 
(3.06) 




Proportion of wetland (%)  4.68 
(8.94) 
Proportion of rural area (%)  2.61 
(5.31) 
Elevation (feet)  399 
(237) 
    
 
 




) ln(y µ   10.125 
(0.061) 
) ln(y σ   0.435 
(0.012) 
λ   -0.0135 
(0.007) 
) ln( / α σ ρ   -0.170 
(0.039) 
ν   0.925 
(0.039) 
Function of value  0.046 
Degree of freedom  86 
    The values in the parentheses are standard errors. Table 4.3  Estimated Parameters of Stage 2  
 
 
 Linear  Inverse  semi-log  Quadratic 



































































1 γ      -2.6E-7 
(6.6E-8) 
2
2 γ      4.7E-7 
(2.7E-8) 
2
3 γ      -2.9E-8 
(6.0E-9) 
2
4 γ      -5.3E-7 
(8.4E-7) 
2
5 γ      -7.1E-7 
(6.2E-8) 
2
6 γ      2.1E-7 
(1.9E-7) 
2
7 γ      -1.4E-8 
(1.2E-9) 
  The values in the parentheses are standard errors. 
 
 Table 4.4  Estimated Parameters of Stage 2 without Environmental Amenities 
 
 
 Linear  Inverse  semi-log  Quadratic 





































1 γ      3.7E-8 
(2.0E-9) 
2
2 γ      5.8E-7 
(5.7E-8) 
 
 
 
 
 